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Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategy

 Vietnam has pursued a strategic balancing act in the South China Sea, leveraging a combination of island-building, coast guard modernization, diplomatic engagement, and security partnerships to defend its maritime claims and commercial interests while avoiding overt escalation. A recent analysis by the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative describes how Vietnam has converted small features in the Spratlys into more robust bases equipped for defense, with expanded landmass affording room for coastal defenses, radars, anti-ship systems, and launchers. These upgrades, while modest compared to China’s mega-islands, create credible positions that raise the stakes for any Chinese attempt to forcibly seize territory. The same source notes Beijing has chosen not to directly oppose Hanoi’s island work—likely to avoid costly military conflict ahead of the 2025 National People's Congress.

Vietnam’s approach is rooted in both pragmatism and principle. For years, Hanoi has followed what analysts call “bamboo diplomacy,” a style marked by flexibility, resilience, and a refusal to be pigeonholed in China–US rivalry. By expanding infrastructure in the Spratly Islands without installing heavy weaponry, Vietnam signals determination but avoids provocative posturing, ensuring its actions remain defensible under international law while reinforcing its claims.

In early 2025, Vietnam’s modernization included deployment of the VCS‑01 “Trường Sơn” coastal defense missile system. Mounted on mobile platforms, this system deploys anti-ship missiles capable of striking vessels up to 300 km away. Integrated with advanced radar and C4ISR, the VCS‑01 significantly enhances Vietnam’s A2/AD capabilities in the region. This new defense element reflects Hanoi’s broader strategy of combining hard infrastructure with mobile, survivable systems to deter aggression without triggering a full military confrontation.

Vietnam has also dramatically increased its coast guard and maritime law enforcement presence. The Vietnam Coast Guard operates deep within the nation’s EEZ to protect fishing fleets, oversee contested areas, and provide a legal presence at sea. Meanwhile, the Fisheries Surveillance force acts as a paramilitary maritime agency responsible for enforcing domain-specific rules across fisheries and EEZ jurisdictions. These agencies’ constant presence, supported by mobile missile systems and strengthened island bases, builds a multi-layered posture combining law enforcement and deterrence.

Diplomacy remains central to Vietnam’s strategic posture. Hanoi has invested significantly in its “comprehensive strategic partnership” with the United States, formally upgraded in September 2023, to balance against excessive reliance on any single power. It has resisted pressure to join China’s regional security architecture, instead emphasizing adherence to UNCLOS and multilateral norms in forums like ASEAN. The country's cautious island-building was conducted during regional negotiations over a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, reflecting Hanoi’s desire to protect its interests without undermining broader stability.

Economically, Vietnam’s strategy seeks to secure vital sea lanes and oil-and-gas revenues. Vietnam’s expansion of 280 ha of new island space between late 2023 and mid-2024, including airstrips for maritime patrol, fits within a larger vision: control of offshore resources and safe passage for commercial and fisheries vessels. While less aggressive than China’s footprint, Vietnam’s developments are defensible, low-cost, and regionally impactful.

Diplomatic pragmatism is evident in Hanoi’s limited rhetoric toward Beijing, despite overlapping claims. It opted for muted responses when China began large-scale reclamation in 2024, avoiding direct confrontation. Instead, Vietnam built a quiet fact-on-the-ground posture—long-term, defensible infrastructure backed by missile systems and legal paramilitaries—knowing that scaling this up could provoke a dangerous escalation.

Vietnam's strategy is also rooted in operational cooperation under the CSIS conference framework. In mid-2025, regional dialogue identified Vietnam’s approach as balancing visible deterrence with diplomacy. Its employment of joint coast guard exercises with China—such as patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin in April 2025—showcase how Hanoi maintains working relations while preserving its security interests. These missions reinforce rule-of-law messaging and allow Vietnam to present itself as a constructive maritime stakeholder even as it boosts coastal defenses.

Beijing’s April 2025 live-fire exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin came shortly after Vietnam announced new maritime boundaries, underscoring the region’s strategic volatility. Hanoi responded with calm assertion — continuing patrols, coast guard operations, and diplomatic outreach to ASEAN, without escalating tensions. Vietnamese media stressed that China’s drills followed maritime safety rules, indicating willingness to coexist even amid friction.

Vietnam’s mix of island upgrades, missile deployments, coast guard enforcement, and calibrated diplomacy forms a layered approach to deter Chinese advancement without provoking crisis. Analysts highlight that Vietnam’s carefully measured island-building will make any Chinese incursion costly and contested—ensuring that grabs mid-spectrum garners regional and global attention.

While Vietnam’s approach is coherent, it does carry risks. Beijing may perceive mobile missile emplacements and airstrips as a step-change and respond with grey-zone tactics like lawfare, harassment, or threats to commercial interests. There are also regional diplomatic trade-offs: overflow Indonesian and Philippine concerns over Vietnamese expansion hint at possible friction within ASEAN in future talks And given Hanoi’s restrained diplomacy thus far, limited public debate at home may narrow strategic flexibility in crisis.

Looking ahead, new international developments may shape Hanoi’s tactics. The U.S. Pacific Fleet commander’s remarks at the CSIS South China Sea conference in June 2025 underscore recognition that Southeast Asia’s evolving naval balance forms a larger Indo-Pacific pattern. For Vietnam, this encourages further diversification: increased cooperation with India, Australia, and Japan on maritime surveillance, intelligence-sharing, and joint patrols may become habitual, even without formal treaties. Hanoi’s reluctance to formally align belies growing functional interoperability, as Chinese coast guard activity continues to pressure area claimants.

Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy is not static defense—it is active, adaptive, and regionally integrated. Its island infrastructure sends a clear message of territorial resolve; missile systems and patrols bind this with operational deterrence; diplomacy keeps strategic space for maneuver; and regional security partnerships shore up its defensive ecosystem. For Hanoi, the challenge remains constant: deter aggression, secure resources, maintain access, and keep the South China Sea stable enough for trade. Its evolving posture through mid‑2025 reveals a three-pronged model—defend, deter, and partner—that may well define the era’s Indo‑Pacific maritime contest.

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