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Taiwan’s Role in South China Sea Disputes

Taiwan has taken on a more proactive role in the South China Sea disputes in July 2025, quietly evolving from a sidelined claimant to a strategic partner supporting maritime security. Recent developments show Taipei moving beyond symbolic gestures to active intelligence-sharing with the Philippines—a collaboration that reflects mutual concerns over Chinese maritime coercion and seeks to enhance regional stability. This article explores how intelligence cooperation marks a shift in Taiwan’s posture, setting the stage with historical context, detailing the latest joint activities, and analyzing the consequences for the regional security architecture.

Historically, Taiwan's position in the South China Sea has been largely symbolic and static. Taipei retains administrative control over Itu Aba (Taiping Island), the largest island in the Spratlys, and continues to assert legal claims based on historical and UNCLOS principles. However, the Taiwanese government has been cautious in its approach, balancing claims against the risk of drawing Beijing’s ire or triggering diplomatic backlash from claimant states wary of upsetting delicate regional equilibrium's. Intelligence cooperation beyond Taipei’s borders has typically been limited, due to the island’s ambiguous international standing and the sensitivity inherent in any formal security engagement.

This longstanding caution began to shift in early 2025. According to a Washington Post report, Manila quietly removed restrictions on engagement with Taiwan, allowing security channels to open. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro acknowledged that escalating Chinese activity—ranging from water cannons to surveillance—has directly tied Taiwan’s security to the Philippines'. Observers said that Taipei and Manila began exchanging naval intelligence, particularly on Chinese paramilitary movements and upcoming joint exercises in the Bashi Channel and near Second Thomas Shoal. Taiwanese officials familiar with the matter noted these exchanges are part of a broader, unstated agenda to strengthen regional situational awareness without provoking Beijing.

In April and May 2025, the Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration reportedly began sharing AIS (Automatic Identification System) data and satellite imagery with its Philippine counterpart. This form of open-source intelligence complements tighter military and naval coordination observed during joint U.S.–Philippine-led “Kamandag” exercises—where Taiwanese observers were present for planning sessions, even if not publicly acknowledged. Manila’s expansion of visa-free access for Taiwanese nationals and formal coast guard dialogues reflect a strategic deepening of trust, though both sides have publicly emphasized the civilian nature of cooperation and adherence to the Philippines’ one-China policy.

July 2025 saw further intensification. Taiwan's leadership hurriedly reaffirmed that the island does not seek confrontation, but vice-presidential statements also made clear that defensive links with neighbors are now imperative. Regional analysts interpret this as Taipei’s pragmatic recalibration—moving beyond posture to practical collaboration, so Kabul—and shifting its diplomatic stance toward an informal coalition among claimant states. The intelligence dimension is especially telling: Taipei now filters Chinese maritime conduct through a shared Philippine dashboard, allowing Manila to respond more swiftly to intimidation or encroachment.

The implications of Taiwan’s emerging role are profound. First, intelligence-sharing enhances the Philippines’ own maritime awareness and crisis response, making regional maritime surveillance more layered and robust. It enables Manila to mobilize coast guard and diplomatic responses faster, potentially reducing the risk of miscalculation in tense standoffs. Second, Taipei’s engagement marks a soft form of normalization in regional security affairs—its informal role bridging diplomatic gaps still left by formal constraints. Third, this cooperation draws reactions from Beijing and Hanoi: China has lodged protests through diplomatic channels, accusing Manila of undermining the one-China framework, while Hanoi’s response remains cautious, wary of shifting geopolitical dynamics among claimants.

On a broader strategic level, Taiwan’s participation complements U.S. and allied efforts to reinforce the “triangle” of regional alliance—linking the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan under shared maritime interest. The U.S. Pacific Fleet commander recently affirmed that ASEAN claimants are no longer surrendering maritime territory despite Chinese coercion. Taiwan’s quiet coordination dovetails with a larger agenda of multi-layered deterrence—blending U.S. access agreements, bilateral Philippine upgrades, and third-party situational support.

However, this strategy carries risks. Beijing perceives any formalization of military ties between Taipei and other claimants as a red line. Even intelligence-sharing—if made too visible—could prompt diplomatic, economic, or military pushback. Taiwan must balance the benefits of deeper integration against the risk of exacerbating cross-strait or regional tensions. Manila, too, must calibrate its openness, maintaining strategic ambiguity while pressing sovereignty and safety.

Looking forward, intelligence exchanges between Taiwan and the Philippines may expand to include joint cyber threat reporting, surveillance co-development, and coordinated responses to Asian gray-zone tactics like laser harassment or vessel swarming. This axis could eventually attract incremental participation from Japan and Australia, forming a quiet, multilateral maritime sentinel network. Such an outcome could significantly shift the South China Sea’s maritime dynamic—moving from reactive standoffs to preventive situational dominance.

Taiwan’s role in July 2025 illustrates a transformation from passive observer to functional security player. By quietly weaving intelligence-sharing into a broader patchwork of alliances, Taipei adds both capability and credibility to regional defense postures. While the overt structure remains informal, the strategic effect is unmistakable: Taiwan is reasserting itself as a maritime security actor—not only in its waters, but across the wider seas of Southeast Asia.

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