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Russia’s Naval Drills in Indo-Pacific July 2025

The Indo-Pacific region, a critical nexus of global trade and geopolitical competition, has increasingly become a theater for great power posturing, with naval exercises serving as a visible demonstration of strategic intent. In July 2025, Russia’s naval drills in this region, particularly in collaboration with China and other partners, underscore Moscow’s ambition to project power far beyond its traditional spheres of influence. These exercises, conducted amidst heightened global tensions, signal Russia’s intent to challenge the United States-led security architecture while deepening ties with regional actors. This article explores the historical and strategic context of Russia’s naval activities in the Indo-Pacific, examines recent developments in its 2025 exercises, and analyzes the broader regional and global implications, offering insights into Moscow’s evolving role in this dynamic geopolitical landscape.

Russia’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in its historical quest for maritime influence, a pursuit shaped by its geography and strategic imperatives. Lacking warm-water ports for much of its history, Russia has long sought to expand its naval reach, particularly through its Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok. During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy established a significant presence in the Indian Ocean, leveraging partnerships with nations like India and Vietnam to counter Western dominance. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 curtailed Russia’s global naval ambitions, but the early 21st century saw a resurgence under President Vladimir Putin, driven by a desire to restore Russia’s great power status. The Indo-Pacific, with its critical sea lanes and contested maritime spaces like the South China Sea, has become a focal point for Russia’s strategic reengagement. Moscow’s naval strategy emphasizes interoperability with allies like China and India, while also cultivating new partnerships with Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean states, reflecting a pragmatic approach to navigating a multipolar world.

The strategic context of Russia’s Indo-Pacific engagement is shaped by its broader geopolitical objectives. The ongoing war in Ukraine, now in its third year as of July 2025, has strained Russia’s military resources, particularly its Black Sea Fleet, which has faced significant losses, including the sinking of the flagship Moskva in 2022. Turkey’s enforcement of the Montreux Convention, restricting Russian naval reinforcements through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, has further limited Moscow’s maritime operations in the Black Sea, pushing the Pacific Fleet to assume a more prominent role. Russia’s growing alignment with China, formalized through agreements like the 2014 “no-limits” partnership, has facilitated joint naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at countering U.S. influence and signaling a unified front against Western sanctions. Additionally, Russia’s outreach to non-aligned nations like Indonesia and Myanmar reflects an effort to diversify its partnerships, leveraging economic ties—such as oil exports to India—and defense cooperation to bolster its regional footprint.

In July 2025, Russia’s naval drills in the Indo-Pacific have intensified, reflecting both continuity and escalation in its maritime strategy. The “Ocean-2025” exercise, one of the largest since the Soviet era, involved over 20,000 personnel, 300 ships, and 50 aircraft across the Pacific, Arctic, Baltic, and Caspian seas. In the Indo-Pacific, the drills focused on the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Philippine Sea, with significant participation from China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Russian assets, including destroyers RFS Admiral Panteleyev and RFS Admiral Tributs, alongside Chinese vessels like the cruiser CNS Wuxi and destroyer CNS Xining, conducted live-fire exercises, anti-submarine warfare drills, and simulated responses to unmanned aerial vehicle attacks. These exercises followed a joint patrol in the Northwest Pacific, marking the fifth such patrol since 2021, with Russian and Chinese warships circumnavigating Japan’s main islands, prompting Tokyo to label the maneuvers as “provocative.” Russia also conducted bilateral exercises with Indonesia in the Java Sea, a first for the two nations, involving corvettes, a tanker, and a military helicopter, aimed at enhancing interoperability and signaling Indonesia’s non-aligned stance.

Further afield, Russia’s naval activities extended to the Indian Ocean, where it conducted drills with Myanmar in the Andaman Sea and docked warships in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port, marking a rare visit after 50 years. These exercises, part of a broader pattern of engagement with Indian Ocean states, underscore Russia’s intent to project power in a region critical for global trade. The participation of Iran in trilateral drills with Russia and China in the Gulf of Oman in March 2025, under the “Marine Security Belt-2025” exercise, highlights Moscow’s efforts to build a coalition of non-Western powers. These drills, observed by nations like Pakistan and Qatar, focused on maritime target strikes and search-and-rescue operations, reinforcing Russia’s narrative of countering U.S. “hegemony” in strategic waterways. The exercises also reflect Russia’s adaptation to modern naval warfare, incorporating lessons from Ukraine, such as countering drone and missile threats, into its Indo-Pacific operations.

The implications of Russia’s naval drills are profound, reshaping regional dynamics and challenging the global security order. In the Indo-Pacific, the joint exercises with China signal a deepening strategic alignment, aimed at counterbalancing U.S.-led alliances like AUKUS and the Quad. The circumnavigation of Japan, coupled with patrols near Alaska, demonstrates Russia and China’s ability to project power in areas traditionally dominated by the U.S. and its allies, raising concerns in Tokyo and Washington about the erosion of regional stability. Japan, already wary of China’s activities in the East China Sea, has scrambled fighter jets in response to Russian and Chinese aircraft transiting the Miyako Strait, indicating heightened tensions. For ASEAN nations, Russia’s engagement presents both opportunities and challenges. Indonesia’s participation in the Java Sea drills aligns with its non-aligned foreign policy, but it risks complicating relations with the U.S., which conducts the annual Super Garuda Shield exercises with Jakarta. Similarly, Myanmar’s drills with Russia strengthen its military junta’s position but may alienate Western partners, further isolating the country.

Globally, Russia’s naval activities underscore its intent to challenge the U.S.-led security architecture while diversifying its partnerships. The Indo-Pacific drills, particularly those with China, serve as a message to Washington that Moscow remains a formidable player despite its setbacks in Ukraine. The inclusion of advanced weaponry, such as Russia’s hypersonic missiles and China’s missile-equipped container ships, raises concerns about the evolving nature of naval warfare, particularly the potential for perfidy—using civilian vessels for military purposes—in violation of international law. This development complicates the U.S. Navy’s operational planning, as distinguishing between civilian and military targets becomes increasingly difficult, especially in a region where Chinese shipping companies like COSCO operate extensively. Russia’s outreach to Indian Ocean states like Bangladesh and Myanmar also signals an attempt to counter India’s influence, a key U.S. partner, in a region where New Delhi has historically held sway through defense ties and oil purchases from Moscow.

The implications for India are particularly significant, given its delicate balancing act in the Indo-Pacific. While Russia remains India’s largest arms supplier, New Delhi’s simultaneous engagement with the U.S. through the Quad and exercises like PASSEX with Russia in the Bay of Bengal reflects its strategic hedging. Russia’s growing ties with Myanmar and Bangladesh, however, could challenge India’s regional influence, particularly as China’s presence in the Indian Ocean expands through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. India’s silence on Russia’s Indo-Pacific drills, unlike its monitoring of China-Pakistan exercises in the Arabian Sea, suggests a pragmatic approach to maintaining its historical ties with Moscow while deepening Western partnerships. This balancing act may become untenable if Russia’s naval activities escalate tensions with the U.S. or its allies, forcing India to clarify its stance.

The broader global security landscape is also affected by Russia’s naval posturing. The drills with China and Iran signal the emergence of a non-Western bloc, challenging the normative framework of international maritime law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Russia’s narrative of countering U.S. “dominance” resonates with some Global South nations, but its reliance on China risks subordinating Moscow to Beijing’s regional ambitions, particularly in the South China Sea. The U.S., in response, is likely to intensify its freedom of navigation operations and bolster alliances like AUKUS, potentially escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific. For smaller nations, the increasing militarization of the region raises the risk of being caught in great power competition, with economic and security implications for states dependent on maritime trade routes.

Looking ahead, Russia’s naval drills in the Indo-Pacific are likely to continue, driven by its need to offset losses in Ukraine and maintain relevance in a multipolar world. The deepening partnership with China, while strategically beneficial, carries risks of over-reliance, particularly as Beijing’s economic and military dominance grows. For regional actors, the drills highlight the need for robust maritime security frameworks, potentially through ASEAN-led initiatives, to mitigate the risks of escalation. The U.S. and its allies, meanwhile, must adapt to the evolving threat of hybrid naval tactics, such as missile-equipped civilian ships, by enhancing intelligence and legal frameworks for naval warfare. Russia’s Indo-Pacific engagement, though constrained by its resources, underscores its determination to remain a global player, with implications that will shape the region’s security architecture for years to come.

In conclusion, Russia’s naval drills in the Indo-Pacific in July 2025 reflect a strategic pivot to assert influence in a region critical to global trade and security. By leveraging partnerships with China, Indonesia, and Myanmar, Moscow seeks to challenge U.S. dominance while navigating the constraints of its Ukraine campaign. The regional and global implications are significant, from heightened tensions with Japan and the U.S. to challenges for India’s balancing act and the broader rules-based order. As the Indo-Pacific becomes a contested space, Russia’s naval activities will continue to shape the geopolitical landscape, demanding careful attention from policymakers and analysts alike.

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