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Cambodia’s Naval Base Development July 2025

The Indo-Pacific region, a critical arena for global trade and geopolitical competition, has witnessed a surge in maritime activities that underscore the strategic importance of naval infrastructure. Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, located on the Gulf of Thailand, has emerged as a focal point in this dynamic landscape, particularly due to its extensive Chinese-funded upgrades. As of July 2025, the base’s development has sparked concerns among regional and global powers, with fears that it could serve as a Chinese military outpost, enhancing Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia. This article explores the historical and strategic context of Ream’s development, examines recent advancements and activities at the base, and analyzes the broader regional and global implications, offering insights into Cambodia’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The historical context of Ream Naval Base is rooted in Cambodia’s efforts to modernize its naval capabilities amidst a turbulent regional history. Established during the post-Khmer Rouge era, the base, located near Sihanoukville, was initially a modest facility used by the Royal Cambodian Navy (RCN). During the Cambodian Civil War, the navy was neglected, with the base falling into disrepair by the 1970s. Under the Lon Nol government, supported by the United States and the British Royal Navy, Ream saw significant upgrades, including modern piers and repair facilities, enabling it to patrol Cambodia’s coastline effectively. The post-1979 period saw further modernization, with cooperation from allies like the United States through programs like the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). However, Cambodia’s alignment with China, particularly since the early 2000s, has shifted the base’s trajectory. The 2019 revelation of a reported secret agreement granting China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) access to Ream for 30 years marked a turning point, raising alarms in Western capitals about Beijing’s expanding military footprint.

Cambodia’s strategic alignment with China reflects both economic necessity and geopolitical pragmatism. The country’s reliance on Chinese investment, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has grown significantly, with over $600 million in loans accepted between 2020 and 2022 for infrastructure projects, including the Dara Sakor special economic zone near Ream, which has potential dual-use capabilities. Cambodia’s maritime ambitions are driven by its need to secure its 27,000-square-kilometer Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, contested with Thailand and believed to hold significant oil and gas reserves. The RCN’s modernization, supported by Chinese funding, aims to bolster Cambodia’s bargaining power in these disputes while enhancing maritime domain awareness. However, this alignment has strained relations with the United States, particularly after Cambodia demolished U.S.-funded buildings at Ream in 2020 and restricted access to U.S. defense officials, signaling a pivot toward Beijing.

As of July 2025, recent developments at Ream Naval Base have intensified regional and international scrutiny. The base’s formal reopening on April 5, 2025, marked the completion of a Chinese-funded expansion, including a 650-meter deep-water pier capable of accommodating large warships, a 5,000-ton dry dock, a 1,000-ton slipway, and a Cambodia-China Joint Logistics and Training Center. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, presiding over the ceremony alongside Chinese officials, including General Cao Qingfeng, emphasized that the base is open to “all friendly parties,” denying exclusive Chinese access. However, satellite imagery and reports from early 2025 indicate that Chinese PLAN corvettes, such as the Panzhihua and Guangyuan, have been docked at Ream since December 2023, with only brief departures. The “Golden Dragon 2025” joint exercise, held shortly after the reopening, involved 1,315 Cambodian and 760 Chinese personnel, focusing on counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance, but its timing and location at Ream underscored China’s growing influence.

Further developments highlight the base’s strategic significance. In April and May 2025, Ream hosted visits from Japanese and Vietnamese naval delegations, marking the first foreign port calls since the expansion. However, these visits were confined to a secondary wharf and a newly constructed headquarters in the southeast corner of the base, suggesting that China retains exclusive access to the main pier. Posts on X in July 2025 noted that these arrangements reinforce perceptions of Chinese control over key facilities. Additionally, construction progress at a nearby site in Ream National Park, identified in 2023 as a potential air defense command and naval radar system, has raised concerns about China’s broader military presence beyond the base itself. Cambodian officials, including former Defense Minister Tea Banh, have framed these upgrades as essential for modernizing the RCN, but the presence of Chinese warships and infrastructure tailored to PLAN specifications fuels suspicions of a permanent Chinese foothold.

The implications of Ream’s development extend across regional and global dimensions, reshaping the Indo-Pacific security landscape. For Southeast Asia, the base’s upgrades enhance Cambodia’s maritime capabilities but deepen its dependence on China, potentially compromising its sovereignty. The strategic location of Ream, near the Gulf of Thailand’s entrance to the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait—a critical chokepoint for global trade—positions it as a potential asset for China to monitor and control maritime traffic. In a conflict scenario, such as tensions in the South China Sea, where China asserts expansive claims, Ream could serve as a staging ground for PLAN operations, enabling Beijing to project power toward Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore. This prospect alarms ASEAN members, particularly Vietnam, which shares maritime disputes with China and has sought to counterbalance Beijing through partnerships with the United States and India. Thailand, despite its hedging strategy as a U.S. treaty ally, faces competitive pressures from Cambodia’s coastal developments, which could undermine its Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) and complicate joint resource negotiations in the OCA.

The broader regional impact hinges on the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. China’s presence at Ream, even if not a full-fledged base, complements its network of dual-use facilities, such as the Djibouti base and South China Sea outposts, enhancing its ability to challenge U.S. naval dominance. The 650-meter pier, capable of berthing aircraft carriers, signals China’s intent to diversify maritime access and de-risk supply chains, as part of its BRI strategy. This development has prompted responses from other powers. The United States, wary of China’s growing footprint, has intensified its freedom of navigation operations and strengthened alliances like AUKUS and the Quad. Japan’s port call to Ream, followed by its provision of patrol vessels to Vietnam, reflects Tokyo’s efforts to counter Chinese influence through soft power and defense cooperation. India, with its own naval ambitions in the region, faces a strategic challenge, as Ream’s proximity to the Malacca Strait could offset its investments in Indonesia’s Sambang port, potentially escalating India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Globally, Ream’s development underscores the challenges of maintaining a rules-based maritime order. China’s selective engagement with Cambodia, framed as non-targeted cooperation, contrasts with its assertive actions in the South China Sea, raising questions about transparency and compliance with international norms, such as the Cambodian constitution’s prohibition on foreign military bases. The United States has expressed concerns about exclusive PLAN access, with a State Department spokesperson noting in December 2023 that such a presence could undermine regional security. These fears were amplified by the demolition of U.S.-funded facilities and the continuous presence of Chinese warships, which analysts interpret as a shift in Cambodia’s alignment away from Washington. The base’s upgrades also highlight the evolving nature of naval warfare, with China’s integration of radar systems and potential air defense capabilities at Ream National Park suggesting a hybrid approach that could complicate U.S. and allied operations in a conflict scenario.

For Cambodia, the economic benefits of Chinese investment are undeniable, supporting its maritime resource development and coastal infrastructure. However, this comes at the cost of heightened geopolitical scrutiny and potential isolation from Western partners. The base’s development has strained U.S.-Cambodia relations, with Washington’s concerns often met with dismissive responses from Phnom Penh, as seen in Hun Manet’s April 2025 remarks. Cambodia’s insistence on neutrality, evidenced by hosting U.S., Canadian, and Japanese ships in late 2024 and early 2025, reflects an attempt to balance great power influences, but its deep economic ties with China limit its strategic autonomy. The Golden Dragon exercises and Xi Jinping’s planned visit in April 2025 further cement this alignment, potentially positioning Cambodia as a key node in China’s regional security architecture alongside non-Western partners like Russia and Iran.

The long-term implications depend on how Cambodia navigates its role in great power competition. If tensions escalate in the South China Sea, Ream could become a flashpoint, enabling China to block the Malacca Strait or support operations against U.S. allies. This scenario would pressure ASEAN to strengthen its maritime security frameworks, potentially through a Code of Conduct, though progress remains slow. For the United States, countering China’s influence requires sustained engagement with Cambodia, as disengagement risks further tilting Phnom Penh toward Beijing. India and Japan, as Quad members, could expand defense cooperation with ASEAN states to offset China’s gains, but this requires navigating Cambodia’s domestic politics and threat perceptions toward neighbors like Thailand and Vietnam. Globally, Ream’s development highlights the challenges of managing dual-use infrastructure in a multipolar world, where economic and military objectives blur, complicating efforts to maintain stability.

In conclusion, Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base development in July 2025 reflects a strategic pivot toward China, driven by economic and security imperatives but fraught with regional and global consequences. The base’s upgrades, while enhancing Cambodia’s naval capabilities, raise concerns about Beijing’s expanding influence, particularly in the context of South China Sea tensions and the Malacca Strait’s strategic importance. The implications for ASEAN, the Indo-Pacific, and the global maritime order underscore the need for balanced engagement to prevent escalation and preserve regional stability. As Cambodia navigates its role, the base’s trajectory will shape the broader geopolitical landscape, demanding careful attention from policymakers and analysts.

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