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Japan-Philippines Naval Ties in July 2025

Japan and the Philippines elevated their naval cooperation significantly in July 2025, building on initiatives launched over the past year following the 2024 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). This diplomatic framework, ratified by Japan’s Diet in June 2025 and earlier by the Philippines, has unlocked deeper operational collaboration. In mid-June and July, ships and sailors from both navies conducted coordinated maneuvers in the West Philippine Sea, reflecting a shared commitment to maritime security, freedom of navigation, and deterrence in the face of growing regional tensions.

One of the most visible examples of this cooperation occurred on July 14 when two Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers—JS Ise and JS Suzunami—docked at Manila’s port under Japan’s Indo-Pacific Deployment 2025 (IPD25) mission. These vessels participated in goodwill activities and engaged with Philippine naval personnel through ship-rider programs and joint training sessions. Armed Forces of the Philippines spokespersons highlighted that these visits fostered not only interoperability but also people-to-people ties essential for deeper defence coordination. Following port calls, the Japanese destroyers joined Philippine naval ships in multilateral maritime exercises extending into the South China Sea, involving tactical cross-deck operations, communications drills, and division maneuvers.

Earlier in June, a bilateral “Maritime Cooperative Activity” (MCA) took place in Philippine waters off Zambales and Occidental Mindoro. Guided-missile destroyer JS Takanami and Philippine frigate BRP Miguel Malvar carried out anti-submarine warfare training, communications workups, photo-ex, coordinated officer-of-the-watch drills, and cross-deck operations involving SH-60K and AW-159 helicopters. These activities, which lasted approximately eight hours, marked the second MCA under the RAA and were praised by AFP officials as vital steps toward operational readiness and interoperability.

The security dialogue between Tokyo and Manila also bore tangible outcomes: in July, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro reportedly agreed in Singapore to transfer six decommissioned Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippine Navy. These vessels are expected to augment Manila’s sea control capabilities and deepen interoperability through joint refit and equipment installation programs.

Beyond bilateral drills, Tokyo and Manila are increasingly coordinating trilaterally with the United States. Joint coast guard exercises and naval maneuvers in both Philippine and Japanese waters have involved the US Coast Guard and Navy, alongside their Japanese and Philippine counterparts. These activities, part of a broader push to reinforce a free and open Indo-Pacific, have tested combined search-and-rescue procedures, collision avoidance drills, and crisis response coordination.

From a strategic standpoint, Japan and the Philippines see the MCA and destroyer transfer as essential tools for reinforcing deterrence against maritime coercion—particularly Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. AFP leadership emphasized that deeper interoperability, as well as shared maritime surveillance and intelligence functions, are critical to maintaining stability across key sea-lanes. Manila’s increased maritime capabilities complement Japan’s growing security architecture, which has seen a dramatic shift under Tokyo’s revised defense policy.

Several senior officials have underscored that these cooperative activities are designed not only for defence but also for humanitarian missions. The RAA allows forces to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, port visits, logistical support, and training without cumbersome diplomatic clearance. In scenarios ranging from natural disasters to maritime interdiction, these capabilities translate into lives saved and crises managed. Manila and Tokyo reaffirmed this jointly, underlining the RAA’s significance as a flexible, security-plus tool.

Geopolitical signaling also matters. Japan’s transfer of destroyers, deepened training exercises, and enhanced operational dialogue signal a visible shift in Tokyo’s posture in Southeast Asia. These moves reflect a broader Japanese strategy to hedge against regional uncertainty while supporting key partners outside the US-led defense framework. Armed Forces of the Philippines officials see this as critical: combined benefit from Manila’s location and Japan’s maritime reach can help counter Chinese grey-zone tactics.

Journalists and observers note that these naval activities help sustain momentum begun with trilateral summits, including a virtual leaders meeting in January 2025 where the US, Japan and the Philippines pledged to deepen maritime, technology, and economic cooperation. Under these accords, Japan and the Philippines reaffirmed their support for a rules-based maritime order and a shared commitment to resisting unilateral attempts to alter the regional status quo by force.

These naval ties have other downstream impacts: Japanese funding continues to support Philippine maritime infrastructure modernization, including radar systems, patrol vessels, and training platforms. Australian specialists and technicians have also participated, adding layers of regional integration to Manila’s coast guard and navy. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s multilateral Komodo exercises and trilateral Balikatan drills have welcomed Japanese ships, reinforcing the concept of interoperability beyond bilateral frameworks.

Amid Chinese complaints—accusing Tokyo of creating instability—the Philippines and Japan remain undeterred, emphasizing lawful deterrence and shared interest in maritime security. As Deputy Defense Ministers, military chiefs, and foreign affairs leaders continue to meet at strategic dialogue tables, their naval cooperation remains a central pillar of regional defence architecture—practical, politically calibrated, and expanding.

Looking ahead, more joint exercises are expected in late 2025, possibly expanding into multi-domain areas like cybersecurity, unmanned systems, ISR, and combined littoral operations. Analysts suggest that Japan and the Philippines may adopt a “rules-based plus” approach—bringing more countries under structured but flexible interaction aimed at reinforcing international law rather than escalating conflict.

For now, Japan–Philippines naval cooperation in July 2025 marks more than a drill cycle; it’s the operational expression of shared values and shared turf in an era where strategic purpose matters. July 2025 stands as one of their most consequential partnership months to date.

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