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Brunei’s South China Sea Claims July 2025Brunei’s South China Sea Claims July 2025: Analyzing Quiet Diplomacy Amid Rising Tensions

Amid intensifying competition and growing militarization in the South China Sea, Brunei’s reserved yet strategic approach toward its maritime claims stands in stark contrast to the more confrontational policies adopted by its regional peers. In July 2025, as neighboring claimants bolster their naval postures and engage in high-profile diplomacy or direct confrontation with Beijing, Brunei continues to adhere to a policy of quiet diplomacy—deliberately avoiding escalation while affirming its sovereign rights. This article explores the historical foundations of Brunei’s claims, recent developments in its engagement with China, and the broader implications for regional geopolitics and ASEAN unity.

Brunei Darussalam’s claim in the South China Sea is comparatively modest, both in scale and tone. Unlike Vietnam, the Philippines, or Malaysia, Brunei has refrained from taking its disputes to international legal forums or conducting large-scale naval patrols in contested waters. The country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), overlapping with China’s expansive “nine-dash line,” covers parts of the southern Spratly Islands—particularly the Louisa Reef, Rifleman Bank, and Owen Shoal. These features, while small and submerged, fall within Brunei’s maritime jurisdiction as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, rather than emphasizing confrontation, Brunei has largely maintained a policy of bilateral dialogue and regional consensus-building.

Historically, Brunei’s posture has been shaped by both pragmatism and its unique position within ASEAN. As one of Southeast Asia’s wealthiest nations per capita, Brunei maintains a small defense force and relies heavily on diplomatic capital to safeguard its interests. Despite its long-standing claim over a portion of the Spratlys, Brunei was notably absent from the list of countries actively protesting China’s militarization of artificial islands or its deployment of naval assets. This cautious stance aligns with Brunei’s broader foreign policy doctrine of non-alignment, neutrality, and conflict avoidance. At the same time, Brunei has quietly supported ASEAN mechanisms that seek peaceful resolution and adherence to UNCLOS, including the long-negotiated Code of Conduct (CoC) with China.

Recent developments as of July 2025 have brought renewed attention to Brunei’s silent maneuvering. Diplomatic sources in Bandar Seri Begawan indicate that the Sultanate has stepped up behind-the-scenes talks with Beijing regarding hydrocarbon exploration rights within its EEZ. While there is no public confirmation of formal agreements, there is growing evidence that Chinese survey ships have not entered Bruneian waters in the past year—a possible outcome of successful diplomatic engagement. At the ASEAN-China Special Summit in May 2025, Brunei’s representatives were instrumental in bridging dialogue gaps, especially during sessions that sought to reframe the CoC’s enforcement clauses. The country’s mediation role, while rarely spotlighted in media coverage, has become increasingly valuable as regional players seek to balance deterrence with diplomacy.

The energy dimension remains central to Brunei’s maritime interests. With declining oil and gas reserves onshore and in nearshore fields, the Sultanate’s future economic stability hinges on access to offshore resources. Its EEZ in the South China Sea holds untapped energy potential that is essential for sustaining its revenue streams. Yet, unlike other claimants who have invited foreign firms for joint exploration—often provoking Chinese backlash—Brunei has maintained a low-profile, state-controlled approach, likely coordinated informally with Beijing to avoid provocation. This approach reflects Brunei’s recognition that its leverage lies not in military strength but in regulatory control, legal clarity under UNCLOS, and its ability to negotiate quietly yet firmly.

Brunei’s strategy has garnered both praise and critique within ASEAN circles. Proponents argue that it offers a model for de-escalation—one where diplomatic engagement can secure national interests without resorting to public confrontations or legal showdowns. Critics, however, contend that such quietism risks emboldening China’s creeping expansionism, especially when stronger collective action might better preserve ASEAN’s maritime integrity. The Philippines’ 2016 arbitration victory against China, though legally significant, has not curbed Beijing’s assertive behavior. Against this backdrop, Brunei’s approach may appear passive. Yet, it arguably reflects a strategic calculus that privileges long-term stability and economic continuity over short-term symbolism.

Brunei’s maritime diplomacy also intersects with broader geopolitical shifts in 2025. With the United States and its Quad allies increasing their presence in the South China Sea, smaller states like Brunei face mounting pressure to align with one bloc or another. However, Bandar Seri Begawan has resisted binary alignments, choosing instead to strengthen intra-ASEAN cooperation. This was evident during the June 2025 ASEAN Maritime Dialogue, where Brunei advocated for a unified regional surveillance framework without invoking external powers. While this stance may not deter Chinese activities outright, it reinforces ASEAN centrality and signals a preference for multilateralism rooted in Southeast Asian norms.

Despite its cautious demeanor, Brunei remains aware of the long-term stakes. Should tensions in the South China Sea escalate further, the country may be forced to recalibrate its approach. The increasing use of gray-zone tactics—such as fishing militia, coercive surveys, and cyber intrusions—poses new challenges that cannot be addressed solely through quiet diplomacy. Brunei’s defense establishment, though limited in size, has initiated confidential reviews of surveillance capabilities and maritime domain awareness tools. These reviews, aided by partnerships with Singapore and Japan, may yield discreet but important upgrades in Brunei’s ability to monitor its maritime zone. While the Sultanate avoids overt militarization, it is not blind to strategic realities.

Furthermore, Brunei’s diplomacy in 2025 cannot be decoupled from domestic considerations. The country’s younger population, while generally disengaged from foreign policy debates, is becoming increasingly aware of regional developments through social media and digital news. This emerging public consciousness may in time pressure the government to adopt a slightly more assertive narrative. However, given the centralized nature of Brunei’s political system, foreign policy shifts are likely to be incremental and carefully managed. For now, the ruling establishment views quiet diplomacy as both effective and congruent with national values.

In sum, Brunei’s South China Sea strategy in July 2025 illustrates the enduring utility of quiet diplomacy in an era of escalating maritime contestation. By adhering to legal norms, leveraging diplomatic capital, and avoiding public confrontation, the Sultanate has preserved its claims without incurring retaliatory costs. While such a strategy may not suit larger or more exposed claimants, it reflects a tailored, pragmatic approach that prioritizes sovereignty through subtlety rather than spectacle. As the South China Sea enters yet another turbulent phase, Brunei’s voice—though soft—remains strategically resonant.

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