South China Sea Disputes (July 2025): the dynamic between China and the Philippines

Tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea have escalated sharply in July 2025, drawing in broader regional powers and renewing concerns of a potential flashpoint in maritime Asia. The contested waters, rich in natural resources and vital for global trade, have once again become the focus of daily stand-offs, naval maneuvers, and diplomatic warnings. What began as routine maritime confrontations has now intensified into a prolonged geopolitical standoff involving not only Beijing and Manila but also Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, and other actors committed to upholding freedom of navigation.

At the center of the dispute is the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, yet claimed aggressively by China. Filipino marines have occupied the shoal since 1999 aboard a deliberately grounded naval ship, the Sierra Madre. Over recent months, China has sought to blockade resupply missions to the outpost, using water cannons, naval militia, and coercive maritime tactics. The July 2025 supply run was again met with Chinese interference, resulting in minor injuries to Filipino sailors and damage to civilian supply boats. This triggered a harsh response from the Philippines, which summoned the Chinese ambassador and publicly released footage of the encounter, further inflaming domestic sentiment.

The shift in Philippine posture under President Marcos Jr. has been evident since early 2023, but July marks a clear break from past restraint. The Philippines has increased patrols in its western maritime zones, bolstered coordination with the United States, and invited more foreign naval visits. In a particularly bold move this month, Manila formally asked for clarification under the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US, questioning whether repeated Chinese harassment constitutes an “armed attack.” Washington responded cautiously, reaffirming its commitment to defend the Philippines while urging de-escalation. Still, the presence of US Navy assets near the Spratly Islands this month has added weight to Manila’s calls.

China, for its part, frames its activities as lawful enforcement of sovereignty and accuses the Philippines of provocative behavior. Beijing’s statements have grown more aggressive in tone, warning the Marcos administration against “collusion with external forces.” Satellite imagery has shown a growing concentration of Chinese maritime militia vessels near disputed shoals, and Chinese state media has been amplifying nationalist rhetoric. Analysts note that domestic pressures, including a slowing economy and rising youth unemployment, may be pushing Beijing toward hardline posturing to consolidate internal legitimacy. The sea offers a theater where China can assert dominance without risking a full-scale war—yet miscalculation remains a looming risk.

Amid this environment, the broader balance of power is subtly shifting. Japan has increased surveillance over the sea lanes stretching from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. Australia, meanwhile, dispatched a naval vessel to conduct joint exercises with Philippine forces in Palawan. Vietnam remains cautious but increasingly vocal about its own claims. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a lukewarm statement calling for dialogue but failed to reach consensus on even symbolic language condemning Chinese actions. The cracks in ASEAN unity only highlight how deeply this maritime dispute cuts through the strategic fabric of the region.

Economically, the South China Sea remains critical. Over $3 trillion in annual trade passes through these waters. Oil and gas reserves in contested areas are vast, and illegal fishing by Chinese vessels continues to spark anger among Southeast Asian nations. This month, a Filipino fisherman’s death following a collision with a Chinese vessel added a deeply human element to an otherwise strategic contest. Manila’s government pledged financial compensation and promised to investigate, while Chinese authorities denied responsibility and blamed weather conditions. The incident, widely shared on Philippine social media, drew thousands to protest outside the Chinese embassy in Manila.

Perhaps the most alarming development in July has been the cyber dimension of the dispute. Several Philippine government websites were defaced or taken offline in coordinated attacks attributed by private security firms to groups linked to Chinese state entities. While no official attribution has been made, the timing and messaging of the breaches coincide directly with military stand-offs. This has prompted Manila to seek cyber defense cooperation with Tokyo and Washington, adding a new layer to the already multifaceted conflict.

The Philippines is not only seeking more robust defense but also trying to internationalize the dispute. In late July, it lodged a formal protest at the United Nations, referencing the 2016 arbitral ruling that invalidated China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim. China continues to reject the ruling outright, yet the diplomatic act keeps the narrative alive on the international stage. European states like France and Germany have expressed concern but stopped short of direct involvement. India, with its own tensions with China, has issued a veiled statement in support of UNCLOS principles.

The Biden administration’s stance has so far been consistent—supporting international law and promising to defend the Philippines if attacked. However, the upcoming US elections and uncertainty over future American foreign policy have led some in Manila to explore diversification. Talks are reportedly underway with France for arms procurement and with Japan for maritime security cooperation. These steps represent a significant evolution in how smaller powers navigate great power competition—by building flexible, multi-layered deterrence frameworks that don’t rely solely on Washington.

For China, the dilemma is strategic. Escalating too far could trigger a regional backlash, but showing weakness might encourage what it sees as creeping encroachment. Xi Jinping’s leadership has shown no sign of backing down, and the PLA Navy has adopted a more confrontational approach in grey zone operations. State-run publications portray the Philippines as a proxy, diminishing its sovereignty and agency. This narrative serves dual purposes—delegitimizing Manila and justifying future escalations.

Meanwhile, Philippine civil society is increasingly involved. Universities, think tanks, and activist groups are organizing awareness campaigns, while journalists embed with the Navy to document confrontations. For a country often seen as peripheral to major geopolitical narratives, the current crisis has brought unusual visibility. It has also become a test case for how smaller democracies can push back against larger authoritarian neighbors without resorting to outright conflict.

In Beijing, elite discussions seem to be split. Some argue that maritime assertiveness is necessary to prevent further US encroachment in China’s near seas. Others warn that the Philippines is not Vietnam—it enjoys treaty protections and public global sympathy. Even a minor incident, such as a misfired warning shot or accidental collision, could spiral. For this reason, while rhetoric has intensified, kinetic activity remains just below the threshold of outright warfare. Each side is calibrating, watching, and reacting—a dangerous dance over disputed reefs and submerged rocks.

The South China Sea is not new to tension, but July 2025 has shown how rapidly it can flare when strategic ambiguity meets calculated provocation. The waters may seem calm from a satellite’s view, but beneath lies a region simmering with resentment, rivalry, and resistance. The months ahead will test whether diplomacy, deterrence, or something darker will shape Asia’s maritime future.

References (for citation and verification):

1. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-china-clash-south-china-sea-2025-07-10

2. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/14/china-warns-philippines-over-supply-runs

3. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3255771/us-navy-conducts-patrol-near-second-thomas-shoal

4. https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/the-cyber-battle-in-the-south-china-sea/

5. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Philippines-seeks-clarification-on-defense-treaty 

6. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68948890

7. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/217345/filipino-fisherman-dies-after-china-vessel-collision

8. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2025/7/15/protests-erupt-over-china-sea-dispute.html

9. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/07/18/japan-boosts-support-to-philippines-amid-sea-dispute

10. https://www.un.org/press/en/2025/sc15499.doc.htm