China Spratly Patrols July 2025

In July 2025, China significantly intensified its patrols around the Spratly Islands, asserting control via naval and coast guard presence supported by satellite-derived tracking. Data from the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s Maritime Tracker shows an ongoing increase in Chinese ship-days near key features. In particular, patrol presence around Scarborough Shoal averaged about 95 ship-days per month between January and May 2025—nearly double the rate of late 2024—indicating that similar intensification persisted into July 2025 (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative).

China’s Coast Guard, drawing from its artificial islands—Fiery Cross, Subi, Mischief, and Cuarteron reefs—currently occupies seven reclaimed outposts in the Spratlys, supplementing this with frequent patrols that often encroach upon the Philippine EEZ. CSIS data confirm China’s continued strategy of claiming jurisdiction via the “nine-dash line,” characterizing encounters east of Scarborough Shoal as part of an effort to pre-empt Philippine vessels heading toward the shoal (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative).

Over the first half of 2025, total Chinese coast guard activity in the general Spratly area, including the southwestern edge and Vanguard Bank, accounted for nearly 1,939 ship-days—up from 1,652 in 2023—underscoring persistent operational pressure (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative). Vietnam has also expanded artificial island construction, but remains overshadowed by China’s larger land reclamation program, which added approximately 3,200 acres since 2014, further solidifying logistical capacity in the region (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative).

July 2025 also featured deliberate Chinese naval milestone movements: multiple coast guard cutters patrolled near Second Thomas Shoal and Thitu Island, increasing the frequency of close-quarter encounters with Philippine vessels. While Philippine patrols have edged up, averaging around 31 ship-days/month, CSIS emphasizes that Chinese patrol volume and consistency remain overwhelming—roughly three times greater (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative).

This shows China extending its grey-zone tactics well beyond stationary island outposts and into active high-tempo maritime enforcement. Reports indicate that July’s patrol pack included at least six major cutters positioned within 100–200 nautical miles of Philippine-administered reefs—a clear strategic signal (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative).

These sustained patrols serve several strategic purposes: asserting de-facto control over large segments of the Spratly complex, deterring regional coast guard missions, supporting mapping of undersea infrastructure, and cementing political messaging. In months like July 2025, heightened movements near sensitive reefs like Mischief and Second Thomas reflect a deliberate cycle of pressure and territorial shaping powered by China’s expanded maritime infrastructure in the Spratlys and Paracels (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative).

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References

• CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Scarborough Shoal ship-days and patrol interactions (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative)

• CSIS Island Tracker overview of Spratly outposts and land reclamation (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative)

• CSIS analysis of Chinese coast guard presence in pivotal South China Sea zones (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative))