Fragmentation, Rivalry, and Competitive Escalation: Internal Splits within Baloch Insurgent Groups and Their Strategic Consequences (2000–2025)

 

The present phase of the Baloch insurgency cannot be understood only through attack numbers or headline operations. The armed campaign in Balochistan has grown sharper and more ambitious in recent years, but it has also become more divided. Splits, expulsions, rival chains of command, competing claims of legitimacy, and disputes over resources have shaped the trajectory of violence as much as ideology or grievance. The internal history of groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army, the Balochistan Liberation Front, and the various offshoots of the Baloch Republican Army shows that factional conflict is not a side story. It is central to how the insurgency operates.

The Baloch Liberation Army emerged in the mid 1990s and reasserted itself in the early 2000s during renewed confrontation between Baloch militants and the Pakistani state (Fair, 2014; Verma, Baloch, & Valle, 2025). From the beginning, the organization drew heavily from tribal networks, especially within the Marri belt. Authority was tied to personalities and kinship structures rather than bureaucratic command. This structure allowed flexibility and local initiative, but it also created space for rivalry. When leadership disputes emerged, there was no institutional mechanism strong enough to prevent breakaway factions.

The first major rupture came in 2012 when the United Baloch Army separated from the BLA. Reporting at the time linked the split to disputes involving Hyrbyair Marri and Mehran Marri, alongside allegations of financial misconduct (Verma et al., 2025). Accounts indicated that the division was accompanied by clashes over weapons and logistical assets. In insurgent environments where access to funding and equipment determines survival, such disputes often escalate quickly. Control over smuggling corridors, extortion networks, and diaspora donations becomes inseparable from political authority. When trust breaks down, fragmentation follows.

The most far reaching split took place in 2017. Commanders Aslam Baloch and Bashir Zaib were expelled from the BLA over disciplinary disputes, including controversy surrounding Aslam Baloch’s travel abroad for medical treatment without approval from the central leadership (Verma et al., 2025). The fallout produced two rival entities. The original formation became known as BLA Azad, while the breakaway faction adopted the name BLA Jeeyand. This was not merely a disagreement over tactics. It was a contest over legitimacy, inheritance, and the right to represent the armed struggle.

After the split, BLA Jeeyand moved rapidly to assert dominance. It reactivated the Majeed Brigade suicide unit, dormant for several years, and began launching high profile attacks on Chinese interests, urban targets, and military installations (Basit, 2022; Verma et al., 2025). BLA Azad initially relied on ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and targeted killings. It publicly distanced itself from certain spectacular attacks claimed by BLA Jeeyand. The divergence in methods reflected internal disagreement over escalation. It also reflected calculation. High visibility operations bring publicity and prestige, but they also attract intense retaliation.

From 2019 onward, BLA Jeeyand sharply increased its tempo of claimed attacks. According to tallies compiled from militant communiqués and secondary reporting, the group moved from dozens of attacks per year to several hundred by 2024 (Verma et al., 2025). Suicide bombings rose in frequency. Multi day operations aimed at temporarily occupying territory appeared. The January 2024 operation in the Macch area and the March 2025 Jaffar Express hijacking illustrated this new phase (Verma et al., 2025; Reuters, 2025). These actions were meant to demonstrate capability and resolve.

BLA Azad responded with escalation of its own. In 2024 it increased its attack claims sharply compared to prior years. In early 2025 it carried out its first suicide bombing since the split and declared that its own Majeed Brigade represented the authentic continuation of the original BLA suicide unit (Verma et al., 2025). This dispute over the name of a suicide squad may appear symbolic, but it reflects a deeper struggle over historical ownership. In insurgent movements, lineage carries weight. The faction that claims continuity with the past can frame itself as the legitimate heir.

Parallel fragmentation took place within the Baloch Republican Army. The BRA emerged after the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 during a military operation in Balochistan (Fair, 2014; Shahid, 2007). Over time, internal tensions surfaced. In 2018, Gulzar Imam broke away to form BRA Beebagr. That formation later merged with elements of the United Baloch Army to create the Baloch Nationalist Army in January 2022 (Verma et al., 2025). The BNA was presented as a unifying vehicle. Yet it soon fractured.

Following the arrest of Gulzar Imam in 2023, the BNA split into two factions led by Anwar Chakar and Sarfaraz Bangulzai (Verma et al., 2025). Sarfaraz later announced surrender to the Pakistani state. A further offshoot, BNA Beebarg, began claiming attacks not only in Pakistan but also in Iranian territory. Public statements from BNA Anwar rejected responsibility for attacks in Iran and confined their declared struggle to Pakistan (Verma et al., 2025). The disagreement revealed diverging views about geographic scope and political risk.

These divisions show that unity is often short lived. Coalitions are formed to pool strength, then fracture under pressure. The creation of Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar in November 2018 represented an attempt to coordinate militant activity under an umbrella arrangement (Verma et al., 2025). BRAS initially linked BLA Jeeyand and the Balochistan Liberation Front and later incorporated additional factions. It coordinated synchronized attacks on symbolic dates such as Pakistan’s Independence Day and anniversaries related to Baloch political history.

Yet BRAS never functioned as a centralized command. Its communiqués frequently highlighted joint claims, but member groups retained their own media wings and operational autonomy. Accusations surfaced from outside the coalition that BRAS primarily advanced the interests of its strongest members, especially BLA Jeeyand and BLF (Verma et al., 2025). The ambiguous status of certain BNA factions within BRAS further illustrated tension. Coalition politics in insurgent movements often reflect bargaining rather than full integration.

Competition among factions has been particularly visible in the campaign against Chinese interests. Since the launch of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015, militant groups have portrayed Chinese projects as symbols of external exploitation (Small, 2015). BLA Jeeyand led a series of suicide attacks against Chinese engineers, the Karachi Stock Exchange, and the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi (Basit, 2022; Reuters, 2022). BLF and other groups targeted machinery, pipelines, and contractors connected to CPEC (Verma et al., 2025). The publicity attached to attacks on foreign nationals increased the prestige of the faction responsible.

The April 2022 suicide bombing at the Confucius Institute marked the first confirmed use of a female suicide bomber in the Baloch insurgency (Reuters, 2022). The attacker, Shari Baloch, was educated and came from a family affected by earlier military operations. The deployment of women in suicide operations challenged prevailing gender expectations in Baloch society. It also amplified media coverage. BLA Jeeyand used such operations to project commitment and resolve. In 2025, BLA Azad also fielded a female suicide bomber, reinforcing the pattern of competitive escalation (Verma et al., 2025).

Cross border developments have further complicated internal relations. Iran and Pakistan have repeatedly accused one another of tolerating Baloch militants. In January 2024, both countries conducted cross border strikes after tensions linked to Jaish ul Adl activity (Garofalo, 2023; Verma et al., 2025). Within the Baloch insurgent scene, Iranian involvement has become a point of accusation. BLA Azad has alleged that certain rival factions maintain links with Iranian intelligence. In contrast, BNA Beebarg has expanded its rhetoric to include operations framed within a broader Greater Balochistan narrative extending into Iranian territory (Verma et al., 2025). These disputes illustrate how regional geopolitics feeds internal suspicion.

Propaganda strategy forms another arena of rivalry. BLA Jeeyand has invested in specialized units including the Majeed Brigade, the STOS unit, and its intelligence wing known as ZIRAB (Verma et al., 2025). These units are highlighted in communiqués and videos to portray organizational discipline. BLF has published magazines and regular reports, though with less theatrical presentation. Competing claim counts have become common. Researchers acknowledge that militant groups often inflate figures, yet the inflation itself is part of competition for recognition (Verma et al., 2025).

The March 2025 Jaffar Express hijacking represented the most dramatic example of this escalation cycle. The operation involved halting a passenger train in Bolan Pass, taking hostages, and demanding prisoner releases. Official accounts and militant claims diverged regarding casualties and numbers involved, adding to controversy (Verma et al., 2025; Reuters, 2025). The operation drew national and international attention. For BLA Jeeyand, it demonstrated capacity to disrupt transport infrastructure and challenge state control. For rival factions, it raised the bar for what constitutes a headline making attack.

Factional rivalry produces both dynamism and weakness. On one hand, competition pushes groups to adopt new tactics, increase operational tempo, and seek symbolic targets. On the other, fragmentation limits the possibility of unified political negotiation. Without a consolidated leadership capable of speaking for the movement as a whole, the insurgency remains militarily active but politically divided. Comparative research on insurgent cohesion suggests that movements fractured along personal and tribal lines struggle to translate armed pressure into durable political concessions (Staniland, 2014).

The structural drivers of fragmentation are deeply embedded. Tribal segmentation remains influential in Baloch politics. Diaspora activism adds another layer, with leaders based in Europe engaging in advocacy and media outreach. Field commanders operating in mountainous terrain or border regions possess their own networks and sources of funding. When disputes arise, these decentralized nodes can detach and form new banners. Ideology provides a shared narrative of marginalization and resource control, yet organization remains shaped by personalities and local loyalties.

Internal splits within Baloch insurgent groups therefore reflect more than ego or ambition. They are products of social structure, geography, funding flows, and the pressures of sustained conflict. From the BLA split of 2017 to the fragmentation of the BNA and the contested authority of BRAS, rivalry has shaped the pattern of violence across Balochistan. As of 2025, the insurgency stands at a point where tactical capacity has grown while organizational unity remains elusive. Any assessment of future escalation or potential settlement must account for these internal dynamics.

References

1. Basit, A. (2022). The Majeed Brigade: The Baloch Liberation Army’s suicide squad. Terrorism Monitor, 20(13).
2. Fair, C. C. (2014). Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army’s way of war. Oxford University Press.
3. Garofalo, D. (2023). Inside Jaish al Adl armed struggle: Interview with the spokesperson. The Khorasan Diary.
4. Reuters. (2022, April 26). Female suicide bomber kills three Chinese at Karachi university. Reuters.
5. Reuters. (2025, March 14). Death toll rises after Pakistan train hijacking, army says. Reuters.
6. Shahid, S. (2007, November 22). Balach Marri killed: Violence in Quetta, schools closed. Dawn.
7. Small, A. (2015). The China Pakistan axis: Asia’s new geopolitics. Oxford University Press.
8. Staniland, P. (2014). Networks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse. Cornell University Press.
9. Verma, A., Baloch, I., & Valle, R. (2025). The Baloch insurgency in Pakistan: Evolution, tactics, and regional security implications. CTC Sentinel, 18(4), 27–36.*