Operation HEROF 2 by the Baloch Liberation Army: an account and analysis

In late January 2026, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist insurgent group that has waged a long-running campaign in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan, announced and apparently executed a coordinated campaign it labelled “Operation HEROF” (also reported as “Operation Herof 2” or “Herof 2.0”). The operation, reported across multiple districts and involving simultaneous strikes, produced one of the sharpest escalations in the region in recent years, provoking large-scale security operations by the Pakistani state and generating intense media, diplomatic, and local reaction. Reporting and statements from multiple parties show a pattern of simultaneous armed assaults, use of suicide attackers in some locations, attacks on both security and civilian targets, and fast-moving counter-operations by Pakistani security forces. At the same time, major discrepancies in casualty and damage claims between the BLA and Pakistani authorities have made a definitive, independently verified casualty tally difficult to produce in the immediate aftermath. 

What distinguishes this episode from many previous incidents in Balochistan is the scale and simultaneous reach of the assaults as described in public statements and footage circulating on social media. Local and international outlets reported attacks across several districts, Quetta, Gwadar, Mastung, Nushki, Kharan and others, aimed at security installations, paramilitary outposts, police stations, and in some instances civilian infrastructure such as marketplaces and banks. Journalistic accounts described prolonged gun battles in urban perimeters and attempted or successful breaches of selected facilities, accompanied in some reported incidents by suicide explosions or fidayeen-style assaults. The BLA released videos and statements claiming responsibility and naming the campaign as a second phase of a broader “Operation Herof” initiative that it says is directed at military and administrative targets across the province. These claims were amplified through the group’s channels and sympathetic networks, while Pakistani official channels pushed back with counterclaims and their own operational narratives. 

One critical characteristic of the reporting surrounding Operation HEROF 2 is the divergence between party claims and independent verification. The BLA’s public statements asserted high enemy casualties and, in some releases, the capture of personnel or terrain; Pakistani authorities, after conducting clearance operations, published their own casualty counts and emphasized that many of the attackers had been killed during response operations. International news agencies and independent outlets tried to reconcile these accounts, but early counts varied widely: some news wires cited Pakistani officials reporting dozens to over a hundred militant deaths during counter-operations, while the BLA’s figures for security-force casualties were substantially higher than official tallies. Independent verification in such contexts is challenging for several reasons: active combat zones impede neutral observers, local communications infrastructure is often disrupted, and both sides have incentives to amplify or minimise figures for operational and propaganda purposes. Readers should therefore treat raw numerical claims from any single actor with caution until corroborated by independent investigators or a consensus of reputable reporting. 

The operational profile as described in open-source reporting suggests several tactical features worth noting. First, the use of simultaneous strikes across urban and rural zones indicates centralized planning and at least some capacity for coordinated timing, something insurgent groups seek to demonstrate to gain political resonance and disrupt security responses. Second, accounts and footage implying involvement of female fighters and suicide attackers, if independently verified, would reflect both an adaptation of tactics and a symbolic messaging strategy; groups sometimes deploy such elements to signal commitment, broaden recruitment appeal, or exploit security blind spots. Third, the choice of targets, security installations, paramilitary convoys, and critical infrastructure, points to a deliberate attempt to degrade the perception of government control and to attract attention to the Baloch cause both domestically and abroad. Reporting also emphasises the psychological and logistical effects of such operations: disruptions to transport and commerce, temporary suspension of train services, displacement of civilians from conflict zones, and increased security restrictions that can persist beyond the immediate firefights.

The Pakistani state responded swiftly with large-scale clearance and counter-insurgency operations. Security forces described intense operations to reclaim control of affected sites and to pursue remaining fighters, and national officials framed the events as acts of terrorism that threatened regional stability and large economic projects. Pakistani leaders publicly emphasised the need to safeguard investments, both domestic and foreign, and to ensure that projects such as ports and infrastructure in Balochistan remain secure. In their public statements, Pakistani authorities also accused foreign actors of backing the militants, an allegation repeatedly made in past waves of violence but often difficult to substantiate publicly; these claims have geopolitical resonance because Balochistan sits at the intersection of several strategic interests, including the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and regional transit routes. International governments and organisations responded with statements varying from condemnation of violence to calls for de-escalation and protection of civilians; some western governments reiterated designations of the BLA as a proscribed organization. 

Beyond the immediate violence, Operation HEROF 2 raises enduring questions about the political and socioeconomic roots of the Baloch insurgency. The conflict in Balochistan has long blended an array of grievances: claims of political marginalization, contestation over resource extraction and revenue sharing, concerns about demographic and military-settlement policies, and demand for greater provincial autonomy or outright independence among certain factions. Analysts and local civil-society actors emphasise that while armed groups like the BLA represent only part of the Baloch political spectrum, the state’s security-focused response cycle has historically deepened grievances when it is not accompanied by sustained political dialogue and development policies perceived as equitable by local communities. Any sustainable diminution of violence, scholars and practitioners often argue, typically requires a combined approach: credible security measures to protect civilians coupled with transparent economic development, political inclusion, and accountable governance mechanisms that address the underlying drivers of dissent.

Media coverage of Operation HEROF 2 also highlights the role that information operations and social media play in modern insurgencies. The rapid dissemination of videos, claims, and battlefield footage can amplify the perceived success or brutality of an operation, shaping domestic and international narratives within hours. For analysts and journalists, this makes source-criticism essential: verifying the provenance of footage, cross-checking geolocation and metadata, and collating testimonies from multiple independent witnesses are critical steps before accepting partisan claims. At the same time, the information environment complicates humanitarian response and civilian protection: false or exaggerated claims can spur reprisals or lead to panic among populations already living under stress.

In sum, Operation HEROF 2 as described by the BLA and reported by multiple outlets represents a significant flare-up in the Balochistan insurgency with immediate human, security, and political consequences. The episode underscores persistent tensions between militant groups and the state, the difficulty of independently verifying claims in active conflict, and the broader challenge of reconciling security objectives with the long-term political and economic grievances that feed insurgency. Moving forward, observers, both regional and international, will watch whether the Pakistani state’s counter-operations produce durable security improvements, whether the BLA seeks to sustain or escalate the campaign, and whether any political or development initiatives are introduced that can reduce the appeal of armed struggle. For readers assessing the event, the most reliable picture emerges when official statements, group claims, independent journalism, and impartial on-the-ground reporting are considered together and treated with appropriate skepticism where sources diverge.

References:

1. Reuters, “Pakistan forces kill 145 militants in two-day battle after wave of attacks,” 1 February 2026. (Reuters)
2. The Associated Press, “Pakistani forces kill 177 Baloch militants in 48 hours, the highest toll in decades,” 2 February 2026. (AP News)
3. Al Jazeera, “How Balochistan attacks threaten Pakistan’s promises to China, Trump,” 2 February 2026. (Al Jazeera)
4. Times of India, “Herof 2.0 explained: Balochistan is exploding again - and why it matters for Pakistan and world,” 2 February 2026. (The Times of India)
5. The Print, “Armed clashes across Balochistan as BLA announces phase two of ‘Operation Herof’,” 1 February 2026. (ThePrint)