China’s J-35 Stealth Fighter: A Wake-Up Call for Indian Air Power?

The J-35 is a next-generation stealth fighter aircraft developed by China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, and it has been garnering significant attention in military circles, especially across Asia. Sometimes referred to as the FC-31 or the “Gyrfalcon,” the aircraft represents China’s bid to rival the American F-35 Lightning II and establish a more formidable aerial dominance in the Indo-Pacific. While the J-20, China’s other stealth fighter developed by Chengdu, was primarily focused on long-range air superiority, the J-35 is believed to be more compact, carrier-capable, and versatile. For many observers, the emergence of this fighter signals not just a technical leap but a clear statement of Beijing’s regional aspirations.

At first glance, the J-35 resembles the American F-35C, especially in its naval variant configuration. It is a twin-engine stealth fighter with stealth shaping, internal weapons bays, and advanced radar-absorbent materials. The most recent prototypes feature a redesigned fuselage, an improved canopy, and reshaped intakes, all pointing to an evolution from earlier iterations. One of the aircraft’s biggest strengths lies in its low radar cross-section, making it harder for adversary air defenses and aircraft to detect it. It is also expected to field an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, modern avionics, and enhanced data fusion capabilities.

Yet for all its promise, the J-35’s true capabilities remain somewhat ambiguous due to the limited public information and China's tight control over defense data. It is still undergoing testing and has not entered full-scale production or deployment. This creates a challenge for military analysts trying to assess its actual performance. There are open questions about its engine reliability, particularly given China’s historical dependence on Russian engines and the slow progress in indigenous engine development. Some prototypes reportedly used Russian RD-93 engines, though the eventual production model is expected to use a more powerful Chinese WS-19 engine. The development and maturity of this powerplant will significantly influence the fighter’s operational ceiling, range, thrust-to-weight ratio, and sustained performance in combat conditions.

What has heightened regional concern is China’s reported willingness to export the J-35, and Pakistan is the most likely and perhaps the most strategically significant recipient. China and Pakistan have shared a longstanding defense partnership, with the JF-17 Thunder program being a previous example of successful joint development. The J-35’s sale or potential co-production with Pakistan would significantly tilt the regional aerial balance, especially considering the JF-17 Block III already in Pakistani service. The JF-17 Block III, equipped with AESA radar and Chinese PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, is a powerful aircraft in its own right, and the J-35 would add a fifth-generation stealth capability to Pakistan’s air force. This means that India could face a serious two-tiered aerial threat, with fourth-plus generation fighters acting in concert with stealth platforms.

As for the cost of the J-35, precise figures are elusive, but estimates suggest that a single unit could cost between $70–80 million, making it cheaper than the American F-35, though still expensive by regional standards. If China offers Pakistan concessional loans, technology transfers, or joint production models, the final cost to Pakistan may be significantly reduced. Furthermore, with the Chinese military-industrial complex subsidizing part of the development for strategic reasons, the actual commercial cost of the aircraft may not reflect its real technological value. For Beijing, equipping Pakistan with stealth fighters is not merely a business transaction but a strategic move to counterbalance Indian air power and encircle India with a technologically aligned security partner.

For India, the emergence of the J-35 in China and potentially in Pakistan presents a complex security challenge. India currently lacks a fifth-generation stealth fighter in active service. Its existing air fleet includes the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, the Dassault Rafale, Mirage 2000, and indigenous Tejas variants. While these are capable and modern in many respects, they do not possess the stealth characteristics of a J-35 or an F-35. The Indian Air Force has recognized this gap and has pursued the development of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a fifth-generation stealth fighter being developed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). However, the AMCA remains in the design and early prototype stage, and its first flight is expected only around 2028 or later, assuming no delays—something that has historically plagued Indian defense projects.

To mitigate this disadvantage, India has taken several measures. One approach is to further diversify and modernize its existing fleet by acquiring more Rafales or upgrading Su-30MKIs with Israeli and Indian avionics and weapons. These enhancements could help bridge the gap temporarily. Another step is investing in counter-stealth capabilities, such as long-range surface-to-air missile systems (like the S-400 Triumf acquired from Russia), ground-based AESA radar arrays, and airborne early warning platforms like the Netra and Phalcon AWACS. These systems are designed to detect and track stealth aircraft despite their reduced radar cross-section, though with varying degrees of effectiveness.

India is also looking into newer air-to-air missiles like the Astra Mk-2 and Mk-3, which offer longer range and advanced guidance systems. This would enable Indian pilots to strike from farther out, reducing the advantage that a stealth fighter might have by operating undetected. There is also the promise of unmanned aerial systems, loyal wingman drones, and electronic warfare platforms that can be deployed to confuse or track stealth jets.

However, India’s challenges are not merely technical. They are also organizational and strategic. The bureaucratic delays, funding bottlenecks, and lack of synergy between public and private sector players in the defense industry have often slowed progress. To address this, the Indian government has increasingly tried to promote indigenization under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) initiative, encouraging domestic manufacturing, joint ventures, and the simplification of defense procurement procedures. The AMCA is a test case for whether this new approach can produce timely and world-class results.

Geopolitically, India has also sought to counterbalance China’s influence by strengthening ties with Western powers, especially the United States and France, both of whom are keen to support India as a regional counterweight to China. There have been talks, albeit informal, about India eventually gaining access to the F-35 platform or at least some level of American fifth-generation technology, but this remains speculative. The primary focus is still on domestic programs and upgrading existing assets. India is also a participant in multilateral defense exercises like MALABAR (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia), and this cooperation helps in developing joint operational doctrines and technology-sharing on issues like anti-stealth tracking and situational awareness.

What complicates the situation is that China is not just supplying military platforms to Pakistan but also deepening military interoperability. Reports suggest that Chinese technicians, instructors, and even satellite coordination have been involved in Pakistan’s recent exercises and air defense deployments. If the J-35 is inducted into Pakistan’s air force, it would likely come with integrated Chinese command-and-control infrastructure, creating a combined operational framework that would be difficult to counter with conventional Indian air strategies.

The increased military presence of China in Pakistan-administered Kashmir through infrastructure projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as well as potential dual-use facilities in Gwadar, further tightens the encirclement that India fears. In response, India has improved its surveillance capabilities across the western and northern borders, enhanced forward air bases, and prioritized mountain warfare infrastructure.

Looking forward, tensions in the region may escalate not because of one aircraft but because of what that aircraft represents. The J-35 is a symbol of China’s ambitions to reshape the power dynamics in Asia. If this aircraft lives up to even half its advertised capabilities, it could challenge air dominance in contested areas like the Indian Ocean, the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and even influence the broader Indo-Pacific equilibrium. For India, the challenge lies not only in matching the stealth aircraft in kind but in preparing for an era of hybrid warfare, data-centric combat, and coordinated threat vectors involving both conventional and asymmetric means.

India’s real strength will lie in combining its legacy air fleet with next-generation technology, leveraging space and cyber capabilities, and tightening strategic partnerships that enhance collective deterrence. It’s a difficult race to run, especially against a well-funded and centrally coordinated adversary like China. But history has shown that India can adapt under pressure and rise to the occasion when its strategic autonomy is at stake. The coming decade will be crucial in determining whether India merely reacts to China’s moves or reshapes its own defense narrative to operate on equal footing.